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The present stalemate in climate negotiations between the US and the other Annex I countries has led 
policy analysts and economists to explore the possible emergence of alternative climate regimes that 
may be applied after 2012. This paper explores the idea of replacing international cooperation on 
greenhouse gas emission control with international cooperation on climate-related technological 
innovation and diffusion. This idea – recently proposed among others by Barrett (2001) and Benedick 
(2001) – is based on the insight that incentives to free ride are much smaller in the case of 
technological cooperation than in the case of cooperation on emission control. This paper provides a 
first applied game theory analysis of a technology-based climate protocol by assessing: (i) the self-
enforcingness (namely, the absence of incentives to free ride) of the coalition that would form when 
countries negotiate on climate-related technological cooperation; (ii) the environmental effectiveness 
of a technology-based climate protocol. The analysis is carried out by using a model in which 
endogenous and induced technical change are explicitly modelled. The results of our analysis partly 
support Barrett’s and Benedick’s conjecture. On the one hand, a self-enforcing agreement is more 
likely to emerge when countries cooperate on environmental technological innovation and diffusion 
than when they cooperate on emission abatement. However, technological cooperation – without any 
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1.  Introduction 
Climate change control is a global governance problem. Any strategy to 
control climate change will only be effective if adopted by as many 
countries as possible, or at least by a number of countries which account for 
a large share of total emissions. However, due to the absence of a supra-
national authority that can enforce environmental policies and regulations 
on a global scale, climate change control can only be achieved via voluntary 
initiatives and international agreements among sovereign countries.
1 
 
In the context of climate change, the Kyoto Protocol was welcomed as an 
important achievement in international diplomacy, because, for the first 
time, it succeeded in establishing binding emissions reduction targets for 
industrialised countries. However, the US decision not to ratify the Protocol 
has largely reduced its environmental effectiveness, thus inducing all 
countries to adapt their own climate strategy to a new scenario in which 
some major current and potential future greenhouse gas emitters do not 
cooperate on emission control.  
 
Even though Russia’ s decision to ratify the Protocol made the Protocol to 
enter into force on February 16, 2005, its environmental effectiveness is 
widely recognised as very limited. Therefore, a number of alternative 
proposals designed to increase the environmental effectiveness of an 
international climate agreement have emerged.
2 The environmental 
effectiveness of a climate agreement can be enhanced through two main 
steps: (i) by increasing the number of signatory countries, and (ii) by 
making abatement targets more stringent. As a consequence, new recent 
proposals on climate change policy address both the issue of participation 
incentives and the issue of long-run costs of effective abatement targets. 
                                                      
1 This basic point identifies the boundaries of most analyses of international negotiations on 
climate change. See Barrett (2002) for a survey.    2
 
Among recent proposals on climate policy, there is the idea – supported 
among others by Barrett (2001) and Benedick (2001) –   t o  r e p l a c e  
international cooperation on greenhouse gas emission control with 
international cooperation on climate-related technological innovation and 
diffusion.  
 
This idea is based both on theoretical arguments and on empirical facts. 
First, theory suggests that incentives to free-ride are much smaller in the 
case of technological cooperation than in the case of cooperation on 
emission control (Cf. Carraro and Siniscalco, 1995, 1997; Yi, 1997). 
Therefore, a technology-based climate protocol could be self-enforcing, i.e. 
it could be signed by all or almost all countries worldwide. Second, in recent 
years countries have begun to adopt domestic policy measures and to sign 
bilateral and multilateral deals to enhance investments in R&D and the 
diffusion of climate-related technologies (see Section 2 below for an 
overview). This seems to confirm that agreements on environmental 
technological cooperation are easier to sign and implement than agreements 
on emission abatement. 
 
However, albeit self-enforcing – a property which is unlikely to be shared 
by climate regimes where cooperation concerns emission control – a 
technology-based climate regime may not be environmentally effective. The 
reason for this is that while, on the one hand, cooperation on climate-related 
technological innovation and diffusion reduces emissions per unit of output, 
abatement costs and therefore global GHG emissions, on the other hand, 
investments in R&D, as well as the adoption of new technologies and new 
standards, stimulate economic growth both in developed and developing 
countries, thus increasing global emissions. The outcome of these two 
combined effects cannot easily be assessed using only a theoretical 
framework. A quantitative analysis becomes necessary in order to verify   3
whether the adoption of a technology-based climate regime actually reduces 
GHG emissions. This is the key objective of this paper. 
 
Using the FEEM RICE model – a modified version of Nordhaus and Yang’s 
(1996) and Nordhaus and Boyer’s (2000) RICE model – we will make an 
initial assessment of the environmental and economic benefits of a 
technology-based protocol, and in particular of whether the total amount of 
global emissions is actually reduced by the adoption of an international 
agreement in which all countries find it profitable to cooperate on 
technological innovation and diffusion. In order to test the robustness of the 
analysis we will use two different models with different specifications of 
how technical change evolves over time. In addition, sensitivity analysis on 
the key parameters of the models will be carried out. 
 
We proceed as follows. In section 2, we present an overview of recent 
climate initiatives and developments in climate policy. Section 3 describes 
some policy proposals designed to overcome some of the shortcomings of 
the Kyoto Protocol. In particular, we present the main features of Barrett’s 
(2001, 2002) and Benedick’s (2001) proposal. In section 4, we use  the 
FEEM RICE model to examine whether a technology-based climate regime 
would actually yield economic benefits and increase environmental 
effectiveness. The final section draws some policy conclusions. 
 
2.  Climate negotiations and bilateral technological agreements 
In spite of the US decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, several 
climate initiatives have been developed both within and outside the Kyoto 
policy framework. On the one hand, in several Annex B countries measures 
to achieve the Kyoto targets have been adopted (e.g. the EU Directive on 
emission trading or the Japanese climate plan). On the other hand, the US 
has implemented a domestic climate policy designed to achieve a –18%   4
reduction in energy intensity.
2 Most importantly from the point of view of 
this paper, in recent years a large number of bilateral agreements on 
technology and scientific cooperation have been signed between various 
countries throughout the world.  
 
For example, the European Union cooperates on international scientific 
policy with almost 30 countries
3 and the US is engaged in a large number of 
joint technology projects as well.
4 In particular, a variety of proposals on 
technology development projects have emerged in the context of climate 
change control.  
 
At COP 9 in Milan, the US Department of Energy presented two new 
reports from the US Climate Change Technology Program, stressing the 
three pillars of the US strategy on climate change: science, technology and 
international cooperation. The reports discuss a portfolio of federal R&D 
investments in climate change technology development and emphasise that 
research into innovative technologies – such as hydrogen, bio-energy, 
carbon sequestration – will address the issue of climate change by devising 
“a path to stabilising atmospheric GHG concentrations” and ensuring 
                                                      
2 The plan – announced in February 2002 and presented in greater detail at COP 9 in Milan 
– to lower the US greenhouse gas intensity by –18% over the next 10 years in order to slow 
the growth of GHG emissions per unit of economic activity is analysed in De Moor et al. 
(2002), Goulder (2002), Viguier (2002). Although President Bush’s Climate Change 
Initiative implies a very modest US emissions reduction target, it represents at the same 
time an acknowledgement of the long-term character of the climate change problem and 
thus improves the prospects for a US participation in international efforts to combat climate 
change (White House, 2002). 
3 In particular, the EU has signed science and technology cooperation agreements with 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, India, Japan, Russian Federation, South 
Africa, Tunisia, Ukraine, United States, a S&T agreement with New Zealand and has 
formed RTD associations with Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Turkey. For further information see http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/iscp/countries.html 
4 Currently, the US has signed agreements for scientific and technological cooperation with 
34 countries and the European Union. For further information on the activities of the Office 
of Science and Technology Cooperation established by the US Department of State see 
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/stc/.   5




These research activities are to be undertaken both domestically and in 
cooperation with other  countries, as is already demonstrated by the various 
bilateral climate technology agreements signed between the US and other 
nations. For example, the “US-Australia Climate Action Partnership” is an 
initiative consisting of various programs aimed at improving the scientific 
cooperation in areas including climate change science, reduced emissions 
strategies and engagement with business on technology to reduce GHG 
emissions (News.com.au, July 2
nd, 2002, CO2e.com, July 7
th, 2002). A 
similar partnership exists between the US and Japan and aims at promoting 
joint projects and exchanging opinions on various measures to prevent 
global warming (CO2e.com, April 5
th, 2002).  On the same basis, 
agreements for technology cooperation have been signed between the US 
and Russia (Pravda, Jan. 17
th, 2003), as well as between the US and Italy, 
India and China. 
 
The European Union is also engaged in a number of technology agreements 
aimed at the improvement of energy technologies and more generally at the 
development of climate friendly production processes. For example, an 
agreement with China on strengthened environmental technological 
cooperation has been signed
6, while the single EU Member States are 
collaborating in numerous  bilateral projects.
7 
 
                                                      
5 For more information on the US Climate Change Technology Program and its reports see 
http://www.climatetechnology.gov/. 
6 For more information on the EU-China agreement see 
http://www.delchn.cec.eu.int/en/whatsnew/ Pren121103.doc.  
7 See for example http://www.mex.dk/uk/vis_nyhed_uk.asp?id=5834&nyhedsbrev_id=824 
for information on a bilateral climate agreement between Denmark and Bulgaria or 
http://www.climate.org.ua/whatdone/intrn.html for details on the bilateral agreements 
established with the Ukraine.   6
Japan has parallel initiatives with the US and is at the same time 
strengthening its role in climate cooperation  within Asia. In August 2002, 
the Japanese government announced plans to help other Asian countries 
reduce greenhouse gases (Jiji Press, Aug. 1
st, 2002) and the start of a joint 
research initiative with seven developing Asian nations aimed at providing 
technological assistance to the other countries to reduce their GHGs in 
exchange for CO2 emissions credit (The Daily Yomiuri, Aug. 26
th, 2002). In 
addition, Japan also acts  by exporting pollution control technologies and 
implementing (since 1992) a “Green Aid Plan” to develop research and 
provide technological assistance for environmental-friendly projects 
throughout Asia (EIA, 2003).  
 
There is therefore an increasing focus on technology as the main way to 
address the climate change problem, particularly in the long-run. And it is 
also clear that international cooperation can help develop and disseminate 
climate-friendly technologies. The recent success in establishing bilateral 
and multilateral international agreements on technological cooperation may 
suggest that Barrett’s (2001, 2002) and Benedick’s (2001) proposal to adopt 
a technology-based climate protocol might be a better way to address 
climate change than a protocol in which countries must agree on voluntary 
GHG emission reductions. However, the recent initiatives briefly outlined in 
this section are merely indicators of a possible evolution of climate policy, 
but do not yet support any conclusions in favour of a technology-based 
climate protocol. This is why we plan to address this issue in this paper and 
to provide an assessment of this policy proposal, which will be described in 
greater detail in the next section. 
  
3.  A climate policy regime based on technological cooperation 
Despite the fact that the Kyoto Protocol eventually entered into force on 
February 2005, its low environmental effectiveness and the absence of some 
major present and/or future emitters (e.g. US, China, India, Brasil) from the 
set of signatory countries, has led several analysts to explore the possible    7
expediency of other climate regimes. A first option is a climate regime in 
which the US adopt their own climate policy – possibly in cooperation with 
some developing countries – whereas the other Annex B countries remain 
committed to the Kyoto Protocol (Cf. Buchner and Carraro, 2003). A 
second option is a climate regime in which the Kyoto Protocol is integrated 
with measures and policies to induce the US to modify their present 
decision and to ratify the modified Protocol
8. A third possible regime is 
based on a completely different approach, in which all countries are 
required to agree on a climate strategy which is no longer based on the cap 
and trade of emissions. This new climate regime could be based, for 
example, on an international carbon tax (Nordhaus, 2001) or on a set of 
harmonised domestic carbon taxes (Cooper, 1998) or on the adoption of 
different domestic measures to curb GHG emissions (e.g. in the case of the 
Global Climate Marshall Fund proposed by Schelling, 2002).
9 
 
Less radical proposals suggest enhancing the incentives for participation and 
compliance by focusing on some weaknesses in the Kyoto architecture. For 
example, some of these proposals investigate a combination of relatively 
modest short-term goals with more stringent long-term targets, in order to 
lower the initial burden to commit to the climate agreement. These 
proposals often include near-term commitments for developing countries
10. 
Other proposals aim at reducing the expected costs of the Kyoto Protocol by 
introducing hybrid policy instruments, e.g. the combination of a quantity 
instrument (such as emissions trading) with a price instrument (such as a tax 
                                                      
8 One solution often proposed in the literature on international regimes is to link 
cooperation on climate change control (typically a public good) with cooperation on a club 
or quasi-club good. This strategy has recently been explored by Tol, Wise and van der 
Zwaan (2000), and Buchner, Carraro, Cersosimo and Marchiori (2002) which focus on the 
linkage of climate cooperation with technological cooperation.  
9 For a discussion of different proposals see for example Aldy et al. (2003), Aldy, Barrett 
and Stavins (2003), Baumert et al (2002), Barrett and Stavins (2004), CNRS/LEPII-EPE et 
al. (2003) and OECD/IEA (2002). 
10 See for example, Barrett (2001 and 2002); McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1997); McKibbin 
(2000) and Schmalensee (1998).   8
or safety valve)
11. Other proposals suggest  adopting a step-by-step 
approach to climate policy by focusing first on regional agreements 
(regional “bubbles” to be developed within the Kyoto Protocol) and then 
moving on to a global agreement
12. 
 
More radical proposals are based on the observation, largely shared by 
climate scientists, that without a real technological breakthrough it will be 
very difficult to achieve the stabilisation of GHG concentrations.
13 
Therefore, an effective climate regime should be based on measures that 
enhance climate-friendly technological innovation and dissemination and 
reduce the future costs of greenhouse gas abatement. 
 
The idea that technological cooperation is the appropriate tool to deal with 
the problem of global warming is not only the basis of the Bush 
administration’s climate policy, but has also been proposed as the 
framework of a new approach to climate policy at international level by 
Barrett (2001, 2002) and Benedick (2001). They argue that an international 
agreement for the development and diffusion of technologies designed to 
reduce GHG emissions could be a possible approach that countries may 
decide to adopt to combat climate change
14. 
 
                                                      
11 See for example, Kopp, Morgenstern, Pizer and Toman (1999); McKibbin and Wilcoxen 
(1997); McKibbin (2000); and Victor (2001) 
12 See Buchner and Carraro (2004). 
13 This is largely true for motor vehicles and aircrafts, since technologies for reducing GHG 
emissions in these areas are not yet available. Instead, in energy generation and demand, 
there already exist suitable technologies for electricity generation at low carbon and energy 
efficiency measures at various stages of development. Indeed, given that these technologies 
and measures could significantly reduce GHG emissions if adopted on a large scale, the 
main problem in this context is one of bringing the available technologies to market, not 
one of fundamental technological breakthroughs. 
 
14 See for example Barrett (2001 and 2002), Benedick (2001), Edmonds, Roop and Scott 
(2000), Edmonds (2001), Flannery (2001), Jacoby (1998). The relative performance of 
technological innovation with respect to environmental policy tools is discussed in Parry, 
Pizer and Fischer (2002).   9
As discussed in section 2, the idea of a technology-based climate protocol is 
not based on a vacuum. The proliferation of bilateral agreements on 
technology cooperation – and on climate technology cooperation in 
particular – would seem to indicate that the proposal for a technology-based 
climate protocol is worth serious consideration. This type of protocol could 
be established within the UNFCCC and could be a complement, if not a 
substitute, of the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
Let us provide a more detailed description of this idea. Barrett (2001, 2002) 
and Benedick (2001) propose a technology-based international strategy to 
tackle the incentives to free-ride which usually undermine the possibility of 
cooperation on emission control. In particular, Barrett (2001, 2002) argues 
that the Kyoto Protocol provides poor incentives for participation and 
compliance and tries to solve this problem by suggesting an alternative 
climate regime, which is based on common incentives for the development 
and adoption of climate-friendly technologies.  
 
The main elements of this proposal include cooperative funding of basic 
R&D into energy-saving, climate-friendly technologies on the one hand, and 
the implementation of various standards directed towards the world-wide 
adoption and diffusion of new technologies on the other. Common standards 
for technologies are identified through collaborative research efforts
15, 
which are financed through the global R&D fund. Every country should be 
given the option to sign both the standards protocol and the cooperative 
R&D protocol. Since standards are a public good, no country can be 
excluded from using them. By imposing an open standards protocol, Barrett 
accounts for competition which induces pull incentives. In addition, the 
standards protocol is intended to be non-exclusionary in order to encourage 
the widespread adoption and diffusion of new technologies.  
 
                                                      
15 Barrett (2001) cites the example of energy efficiency standards for cars, which could be 
established requiring e.g. the use of new hybrid engines or fuel cells.   10
However, to construct a global climate regime which is accepted by all 
countries, an element of fairness needs to be incorporated, taking into 
account that the current accumulation of GHG emissions in the atmosphere 
is basically caused by the industrialised countries. In order to provide 
incentives for the developing countries to adopt the new standards which 
will require costly technologies, Barrett suggests making the share of each 
country’s contribution to collaborative funding dependent on its 
circumstances
16. In this way, the need for the developing countries to grow 
is satisfied but – acknowledging that they will probably be the biggest future 
emitters – they nevertheless take part in a climate regime. In addition, taking 
the Montreal Protocol as an example, the industrialised countries are made 
responsible for the financing of technological transfers. Thus, a multilateral 
fund would ensure that technologies can spread to developing countries. In 
this way, this approach sets incentives for their participation because – 
although being bound by the technology standards – they can gain through 




Barrett emphasises that the attractiveness of this approach – based on a 
R&D Protocol with complementary standards protocols –  lies in the 
inclusion of both “push” incentives affecting the supply of R&D, and “pull” 
incentives aimed at the demand for the benefits of R&D. In contrast, the 
Kyoto Protocol does not consider the necessity to push R&D, but is based 
solely on the pull incentives which only work by strong enforcement. Also, 
by focusing on incentives related to the funding of R&D, preconditions for 
                                                      
16  In addition, the country’s contribution should be contingent on an agreed total 
expenditure level and the contribution of the other countries (Barrett, 2002). The latter 
element ensures that the fund becomes larger when countries join the cooperation 
agreement and smaller when countries withdraw. In this way, an explicit incentive for 
participation is created and – very important – countries know their commitment costs 
before signing the agreement. 
17 An additional innovative component of this proposal is an adaptation protocol which 
explicitly accepts the responsibility of industrialised countries for the current situation with 
respect to accumulated GHG emissions. Therefore, industrialised countries need to assist 
developing countries in adapting to the consequences of climate change, which are very 
likely to be strongest in these countries.    11
long-term technical innovation and diffusion are created. Moreover, because  
emission targets and time tables are not imposed, this technology-based 
climate regime does not require the enforcement of compliance, but does 
provide incentives for participation.  
 
Note that the more countries adopt a standard, the more attractive it 
becomes for other countries to adopt the same standard. Hence, the more 
countries combat climate change, the greater are the incentives for  other 
countries to follow suit. Therefore, there is no need for strong enforcement 
and monitoring. Once enough countries adopt the standards, none of them 
will have an incentive to defect from the agreement. 
 
These considerations are also consistent with the recommendations derived 
from game theory models that study the effects of cooperation on 
technological innovation (Cf. Yi, 1997). If technological spillovers are 
limited, technological cooperation provides a club good, where benefits 
from cooperation are partly excludable (i.e. free riders achieve a small 
benefit). In this case, the equilibrium coalition structure often coincides with 
the grand coalition.
18 By contrast, as shown in Bloch (1997), in the case of 
public goods, the equilibrium of the coalition game is characterised – in the 




Although there is no doubt that the technology-based approach also has a 
number of weaknesses
20, it does account for some of the crucial 
                                                      
18 Of course other assumptions are necessary, e.g. that asymmetries are negligible and that 
the agreement is profitable (see Yi, 1997). However, what matters in our context is the 
excludability of benefits from cooperation that provides incentives for all or almost all 
players to join the coalition. 
19 See also Carraro and Marchiori (2003) and the other papers in Carraro (2003). 
20 For example, there are problems in ensuring that the “right/best” standards are chosen 
and that the adoption of these standards indeed offers every participating country a benefit 
in excess of the cost. An additional question is who will choose the standards. A further 
concern is that the system gets locked in to a particular standard which would remove the 
incentives for further innovation.   12
requirements needed to make an international climate regime successful: a 
global scale, strong elements for self-enforcement and a high degree of 
probability that the international system will support the approach.  
 
However, there is a basic trade-off characterising the implementation of a 
technology-based climate protocol. On the one hand, technological 
innovation reduces emissions per unit of output by making climate-friendly 
technologies available and by reducing their costs. On the other hand, 
investments in R&D and technological diffusion provide a stimulus to 
economic growth and therefore increase GHG emissions. This is 
particularly true in the absence of any emission reduction targets, as 
proposed in Barrett (2001, 2002). It is therefore crucial to assess whether the 
adoption of a technology-based climate protocol can actually reduce GHG 
emissions, i.e. whether the development of new technologies and their 
dissemination obviates the other collateral effects of the protocol. 
 
Note that other elements of a technology-based protocol need to be carefully 
verified. For example, are technological spillovers strong enough inside the 
coalition (the group of cooperating countries) and small enough outside the 
coalition (towards potential free-riders) to guarantee that all world countries 
are willing to adopt the protocol? In particular, will developing countries 
accept to sign such a protocol? In addition, technology and the skills to 
adopt it are not evenly distributed across the world. Are these asymmetries 
strong enough to prevent the emergence of a global agreement?  
 
In order to answer these questions, and to check whether a technology-based 
climate protocol is actually environmentally effective, we made an applied 
game theory analysis of two possible scenarios: the first one is characterised 
by technological cooperation among the four “traditional” Kyoto 
countries/regions (USA, Europe, Japan, Former Soviet Union), whereas in 
the second one all world countries, including developing countries, 
cooperate on technological innovation and diffusion. For each scenario, we   13
assess the profitability, stability (no free-riding incentives) and 
environmental effectiveness of technological cooperation. 
 
The aim of our analysis is to verify whether cooperation on technological 
innovation and diffusion, without any emission reduction commitments, 
could actually lead to a reduction of global emissions. Were this conjecture 
true, we could conclude that a technology-based climate agreement would 
be more efficient than a climate agreement based on emission reduction 
targets, because the former provides excludable benefits – and thus adequate 
incentives for participation – while reducing the amount of GHG emissions.  
 
Therefore, in the next section we will compare the equilibrium outcomes of 
a game in which countries cooperate on technological innovation and 
diffusion with those of a game in which countries that ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol comply with their emission targets from 2010 onward. This 
scenario, sometimes dubbed “Kyoto forever” (Cf. Buonanno, Carraro and 
Galeotti (2002); Manne and Richels (1999); and Chapter 8 of IPCC (2001)), 
will be our benchmark scenario. It is not necessarily the best one, but it is 
certainly not very ambitious in terms of emission abatement. If GHG 
emissions in a technology-based regime are larger than in the “Kyoto 
forever” scenario, then they are going to be larger than in other more 
ambitious and more important stabilisation scenarios as well. 
 
4.  Technology-based climate regimes. An quantitative assessment 
4.1  The modelling framework 
In the policy setting that we are going to analyse, we compare a climate 
regime based on emission reduction targets (like in the Kyoto Protocol), 
with a climate regime based on technological cooperation. For the 
technology-based regime, we consider two scenarios, where the group of 
cooperating countries is set exogenously. In the first scenario, we assume 
that all Annex B countries – EU, Japan, US, FSU – cooperate on   14
technological innovation and diffusion, without being committed to any 
emission reduction targets (second regime). In the second scenario, we 
assume that global technological cooperation, again without any binding 
environmental restrictions, is implemented.  
 
In the case of the technology-based scenarios, the first step is to verify 
whether the technological coalition is self-enforcing, namely profitable and 
stable. The definitions of profitability and stability have been derived 
directly from Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) (see also Eyckmans, 2001 and 
Weyant and Olavson, 1999 for recent applications to climate policy). We 
say that an agreement is weakly profitable, if the sum of the individual 
payoffs of the signatories is larger than the sum of their payoffs when no 
agreement is signed. In this case, the agreement produces a surplus (overall 
benefits are larger than costs), but this surplus may not benefit all 
signatories, i.e. some countries may gain, others may lose. By contrast, an 
agreement is strongly profitable, or simply profitable, if the payoff of all 
signatories is larger when the agreement is signed and implemented than 
when no agreement is signed. Hence, each single participant obtains a net 
benefit from the agreement. An agreement is said to be internally stable if 
there is no incentive to free-ride, i.e. the payoff of each signatory is larger 
than the payoff he/she would obtain by defecting from the group of 
signatories. Finally, an agreement is stable if there is no incentive to free 
ride and no incentive to join the group of signatories, i.e. the payoff to those 
countries that are not signatories is larger than the one they would receive 
by signing the agreement. 
 
The analysis of the profitability and stability of our two technology-based 
climate agreements (the Annex B one and the global one) is based on 
optimisation runs obtained using the FEEM RICE model. There are 
currently two versions of FEEM RICE. One is based on Nordhaus and 
Yang’s (1996) RICE 96 model, and takes explicitly into account 
endogenous and induced technical change. In particular, as previously   15
indicated, technical change performs a twofold role: on the one hand, via 
increasing returns to scale, it yields endogenous growth; on the other hand, 
by affecting the emission/output ratio, it accounts for the adoption of cleaner 
and energy-saving technologies (a detailed description is in Buonanno, 
Carraro and Galeotti, 2002). A second version is based on Nordhaus and 
Boyer’s (2000) RICE 99 model. This second version has a much more 
sophisticated representation of induced  technical change, even though 
technical change still plays the twofold role previously described for the 
first version of FEEM RICE (a detailed description is in Bosetti, Carraro 
and Galeotti, 2004). 
 
In the first version of FEEM RICE, six countries/regions – United States 
(US), Europe (EU), Japan (JPN), Former Soviet Union (FSU), China (CHN) 
and Rest of the World (ROW) – optimally set the intertemporal values of 
three strategic variables: investments, R&D expenditure and abatement 
rates. Given the interdependency of each country’s  decision, the 
equilibrium value of these variables is the solution  to a dynamic open-loop 
Nash game between the six players. In the second version, there is a more 
detailed geographical disaggregation (8 regions) and a better representation 
of the production structure. Again, an open-loop Nash equilibrium is used to 
determine the optimal dynamic paths of all variables. 
 
Most importantly, technical change is better modelled in the second version 
of FEEM RICE. In the first version, a stock of knowledge, cumulated 
through R&D investments, affects both factor productivity and the 
emission-output ratio. Therefore, the model adopts a standard Learning by 
Researching approach (Cf. Goulder and Mathai, 2000). In the second 
version, both Learning by Doing and Learning by Researching are explicitly 
modelled. More precisely, R&D investments induce the developments of 
environment-friendly technologies through which GHG emission abatement 
can be undertaken. At the same time, these abatement activities increase 
experience and produce learning, which enhance the effectiveness of   16
environment-friendly technologies in reducing GHG emissions (see Figure 
1). The emission reduction takes place through both energy-saving and fuel-
switching effects. In the model, the different components of technical 
change have a differentiated impact on both effects. Finally, the first version 
of FEEM RICE also includes an estimate of international knowledge 
spillovers. By contrast, in the second version of FEEM RICE, international 
knowledge spillovers are not yet accounted for. 
 
 
Figure 1. Effects of LbR and LbD on Technical Progress (TP) in FEEM 
RICE version 2. 
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We plan to use both versions of FEEM RICE, because this enables us to test 
the validity of the proposal of a technology-based climate regime by using 
two quite different models and, above all, two very different representations 
of technical change. It is true that both versions are top down and in both   17
versions technical change is modelled as an aggregate variable. However, 
our objective is normative and the scale is global (the goal is to determine 
the optimal intertemporal policy for all world regions); as a consequence, 
the tools that we plan to use are likely to be the most appropriate to achieve 
this goal.   
 
In the technology-based climate regimes, countries are supposed to 
cooperate on technological innovation and diffusion and thus choose their 
R&D expenditure in order to maximise the coalition’s joint welfare 
function. Countries are not committed to reduce their own GHG emissions. 
Therefore, they implement their domestic welfare maximising abatement 
rate. The same holds for the third strategic variable – investment – which is 
again set by all countries in order to maximise domestic welfare.  
 
By contrast, in our benchmark policy setting in which the Annex B-US 
countries are supposed to comply with the Kyoto Protocol, their abatement 
rates are set so as to achieve the Kyoto targets, whereas the US, CHN and 
ROW implement their domestic welfare maximising abatement rate
21. As 
for the other two strategic variables, they are set by all countries in a way 
that maximises their own domestic welfare. 
 
In order to give technological cooperation the highest probability of being 
successful, we assume that climate policy is undertaken through domestic 
policy and measures (no flexibility mechanisms). Recent studies have 
shown that R&D and flexibility mechanisms are strategic substitutes
22. As a 
                                                      
21 As already said, when deriving the results for the actual Kyoto coalition consisting of EU, 
JPN and FSU, we adopt the so-called “Kyoto forever” scenario which is used in most of the 
literature on the economic costs of climate policy. See e.g., Buonanno, Carraro and Galeotti 
(2002); Manne and Richels (1999); and Chapter 8 of IPCC (2001). In particular, we assume 
that countries which have agreed with the Marrakech negotiations commit themselves to 
meeting the existing Kyoto constraints  from 2012 onward, given that no emission targets 
beyond 2012 are yet defined. 
22 Buonanno, Carraro and Galeotti (2002) show that an international trading system, by 
lowering the cost of complying with the Kyoto targets, also lowers the incentives to 
undertake environment-friendly R&D. Therefore, at the equilibrium, R&D expenditure is   18
consequence, countries have the largest incentive to profit from the benefits 
yielded by R&D cooperation when flexibility mechanisms are not allowed 
for. 
 
In the FEEM RICE model, technical change is induced by knowledge 
accumulation, which is the sum of past R&D expenditures. We assume that 
part of the technological benefits yielded by this knowledge accumulation 
are a global public good, whereas part of them are a club good that can be 
appropriated only by the R&D coalition members. Therefore, R&D 
cooperation is assumed to be an imperfect club good. In the first version of 
FEEM RICE, a parameter β quantifies the increased share of world 
knowledge that can be appropriated by countries belonging to the R&D 
coalition. This parameter is equivalent to the “differential technological 
spillover” or “coalition information exchange coefficient” in the theoretical 
model by Carraro and Siniscalco (1995, 1997). The first version of FEEM 
RICE is thus characterised by the inclusion of two types of international 
spillovers and related parameterisation: spillovers – parameterised by ε – 
which are appropriated by all countries; and spillovers – parameterised by β 
– which are beneficial only to coalition members. In the second version of 
FEEM RICE, no estimate of international spillovers is yet included. This is 
the price to be paid for the more sophisticated formulation of technical 
change embodied in the second version of FEEM RICE. 
 
Note that the coalition-internal spillovers β play a crucial role in 
determining the stability of coalitions based on technological cooperation. 
Therefore, the coalition stability analysis will be performed only with the 
first version of the model. The second version of FEEM RICE will instead 
be used – under the assumption of stable cooperation – to check for the 
robustness of our conclusions on the effectiveness of technological 
cooperation in reducing global GHG emissions. 
                                                                                                                                       
lower in all countries that benefit from emission trading. R&D and emission trading are 
thus strategic substitutes.   19
 
4.2  An applied game theory analysis of two technology-based climate 
regimes 
In this section we proceed in a counterfactual manner. First, we assume that 
only the four “traditional” Kyoto regions (USA, Europe, Japan, Former 
Soviet Union) decide to replace environmental cooperation by technological 
cooperation. The other two regions – China and Rest of the World – are 
excluded for the moment from technological cooperation. Second, we 
evaluate a scenario in which a global R&D coalition forms, namely all 
world countries cooperate on technological innovation and diffusion. 
Finally, as previously explained, we compare the empirical results obtained 
for these two scenarios with those in the benchmark scenario, i.e. in the case 
of a climate coalition where the EU, JPN and FSU are committed to 
achieving the Kyoto targets, whereas the other countries free-ride. 
 
Let us consider first the profitability and stability of climate agreements 
based on technological cooperation. Our results can be summarised as 
follows. Both the coalition in which Annex B countries/regions cooperate on 
technological innovation and diffusion and the coalition in which all world 
countries regions cooperate on technological innovation and diffusion are 
profitable and internally stable for values of β ≥ 0.2. Therefore, as soon as 
the excludable benefits arising from technological cooperation become 
relevant (β ≥ 0.2, i.e. benefits for co-operators are 20% higher than benefits 
accruing to free-riders), all countries find it profitable to cooperate. In 
addition, there is no incentive to free-ride on technological cooperation. The 
reason lies in the availability of economic benefits (parameterised by β) that 
can be appropriated only by coalition members (this also incorporates 
Barrett’s argument about technological standards). Let us recall that this 
conclusion is based on the stability analysis performed with the first version 
of FEEM RICE. 
   20
The above results confirm the theoretical insights on the stability of 
technology-based climate regimes (i.e. on the existence of high participation 
incentives in these regimes). As a consequence, the crucial issue is the 
environmental effectiveness of a coalition in which member countries 
cooperate only on technological development and its diffusion. Are global 
emissions in the case of technology-based regimes lower than in the 
benchmark “Kyoto forever” scenario? 
 
The results obtained with the first version of FEEM RICE are summarised 
in Tables 1 and 2. The first column shows different values of the parameter 
β. The second column contains the change of global emissions in the case of 
a technology-based regime versus global emissions in the benchmark 
scenario. The third column contains the change of the emission/output ratio 
induced by R&D cooperation (again with respect to the same benchmark). 
While the second and the third columns show the results in the first 
commitment period, the fourth and the fifth columns show what could 
happen in the medium term. 
 
Table 1 illustrates that both global emissions and the emission/output ratio 
increase in the case of a technology-based protocol among Annex B 
countries. Note that there are no cases in which technological cooperation 
can induce a reduction of global emissions and/or of the emission/output 
ratio with respect to the “Kyoto forever” scenario.
23 In addition, this 




                                                      
23 At least to the extent that the first version of FEEM RICE model can adequately capture 
the dynamics of induced technical change. 
24 There is a discontinuity with respect to the value of β. As we showed in a different paper  
(Buchner, Carraro, Cersosimo and Marchiori, 2002) for values of β below 0.2, external 
technological spillovers are too high, i.e. free riders get an excessive benefits from the R&D 
investments of the coalition and thus the coalition is no longer stable. We find the same 
result in this paper. Therefore, we perform the sensitivity analysis only for values of β   21
Table 1. Environmental effectiveness of a technology-based protocol 
among Annex B countries 
 


















0.20  + 12.97%  + 12.99%  + 48.28%  + 47.99% 
0.33  + 12.97%  + 12.88%  + 48.87%  + 48.42% 
0.66  + 13.01%  + 12.68%  + 48.60%  + 47.83% 
1.00  + 13.07%  + 12.53%  + 48.46%  + 47.40% 
1.50  + 13.13%  + 12.35%  + 48.18%  + 46.88% 
Note:  β is the differential technological spillover or coalition information exchange 
coefficient. Changes of emissions and of the emission/output ratio are computed with 
respect to the benchmark case in which the EU, JPN and FSU meet their Kyoto targets until 
2050, the other countries/regions do not cooperate on emission control and no technological 
cooperation is implemented. 
 
 
The result that technological cooperation does not seem to be environmental 
effective when using the formulation with international knowledge 
spillovers, and when only Annex B countries cooperate on technological 
innovation and diffusion, depends on two factors.  
 
1) On the one hand, as a consequence of the intensified R&D efforts, 
production increases. This raises the emissions of the Annex B countries 
that cooperate on R&D. Emissions per unit of output also increase, because 
the overall impact of accumulated R&D expenditure on economic growth 
(the endogenous growth effect) is larger than the impact of accumulated 
R&D on emission abatement (the induced technical change effect). 
                                                                                                                                       
above 0.2  (only for stable technological coalitions) and we find that our results are quite 
robust with respect to changes in β above 0.2.   22
 
2) On the other hand, R&D investments in Annex B countries have an 
impact also on the other countries (developing countries) through 
technological spillovers that increase output. These countries have more 
polluting technologies. Therefore, their increased production has a more 
negative effect on the environment (more emissions) than in Annex B 
countries, namely developing countries have a worse emission-output ratio 
and invest less in emission-reducing technologies. As a consequence, the 
average global emission-output ratio increases.  
 
Also notice that when global emissions and the emission-output ratio 
increase, they increase with respect to the so called “Kyoto forever” 
scenario in which Annex B-US regions have emission targets to be achieved 
from 2010 onward.  
 
The above negative conclusions on the environmental effectiveness of an 
international climate protocol based only on technological cooperation are 
even stronger when looking at the situation in 2050. Both absolute 
emissions and the aggregate emissions/output ratio increase by almost 50% 
with respect to the current situation in which only the EU, Japan and FSU 
are committed to comply with the Kyoto targets
25.  
 
The reason for this difference is that the effects of the increased investments 
in R&D can be seen more clearly in 2050 than in 2010. An important 
additional reason is that in the medium term technological spillovers have a 
strong effect on the growth rate of China and ROW (which do not 
participate in the technological agreement and therefore get part of the 
technological benefits – through the global spillovers ε – at no cost ).  
 
                                                      
25 The reason for this drastic increase is that we compare a situation in which the European 
Union, Japan and Russia are committed to strict, binding emission reduction targets (due to 
our use of the “Kyoto forever” assumption) to a situation in which there are no mandatory 
emission reduction targets.   23
Can different conclusions be achieved if a global technology-based regime – 
which would involve all world countries – is established? In this latter case, 
international spillover effects on countries outside the technology-based 
coalition  disappear. Therefore, we could expect a much lower increase of 
global emissions and of the emission-output ratio. 
 
This is indeed shown in Table 2, where however global emissions still 
increase with respect to the benchmark “Kyoto forever” scenario, both in 
the short-run and in the medium-run. However, the emission-output ratio is 
slightly reduced with respect to the benchmark scenario. Note that in this 
case results are independent of the value of β – even though β must be 
larger than 0.2 to guarantee the coalition stability – because all 
countries/regions are assumed to participate in the technology-based regime, 
i.e. they all cooperate on technological innovation and diffusion (without 
binding emission targets). Therefore, at the equilibrium there is no free 
riders an no differential technological spillovers. 
 


















+ 2.19%  - 0.27%  + 9.73%  - 3.75% 
 
 
Again, even though global cooperation increases the economic benefits and 
the environmental effectiveness of the agreement, total emissions in the 
technology-based protocol increase with respect to total emissions in the 
benchmark case. The increase of emissions is smaller when all world 
regions cooperate to develop and diffuse climate-friendly technologies than   24
in the case in which developing countries free ride. However, the hypothesis 
that a policy which fosters technological cooperation can also induce less 
GHG emissions is not supported by our results.
26 
 
The tentative conclusion is that technological cooperation cannot replace 
environmental cooperation. Within the limits of the first version of FEEM 
RICE, our game theory analysis suggests that technological cooperation 
increases R&D, growth and welfare, but also emissions. As a consequence, 
some environmental policy measures, to be coupled with technological 
cooperation, seem to be necessary to achieve an environmentally 
satisfactory regime. If appropriately designed, these environmental policy 




To further check the robustness of the above conclusions, let us use the 
second version of FEEM RICE, where technical change is better 
endogenised. In this second version, there are no international technological 
spillovers. Therefore, we cannot check the stability of the coalition with 
respect to β. We thus simply assume that all world countries/regions choose 
to cooperate on technological innovation and diffusion. We then assess the 
amount of resulting emissions and we compare it with global emissions in 
the benchmark scenario.  
 
                                                      
26 Note that results in the scenario in which all region cooperate on technological 
innovation and diffusion are consistent with the so called “environmental Kuznets curve” 
hypothesis. This was not the case for results shown in Table 1. However, let us also stress 
that there is no conclusive evidence on the existence of  an “environmental Kuznets curve” 
for GHG emissions. Recent studies find curves of all shapes (see e.g. Kelly, 2003; or Bartz 
and Kelly, 2004). And Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) find that the pace of economic 
development does not significantly alter the flow of CO2 emissions, thus yielding an 
“environmental Kuznets curve” that never turns down. 
27 Some results obtained in Buchner, Carraro, Cersosimo and Marchiori (2002) provide 
support to this conclusion. Indeed, we found that total emissions when all or part of the 
Annex B countries adopt technological cooperation and environmental policy measures to 
achieve the Kyoto targets, are smaller than total emissions when international cooperation 
concerns only technological innovation and diffusion. Moreover, with both technological 
and climate cooperation, global emissions are smaller than the global Kyoto target itself.   25
With the new model, results are more in favour of a technology-based 
climate regime. Figure 2 shows the dynamic behaviour of total emissions. 
Note that, in the presence of climate-friendly technological cooperation 
without emission targets, world carbon emissions decrease with respect to 
emissions in the “Kyoto forever” scenario.  
 
Figure 2. The dynamics of carbon emissions in the BAU, in the “Kyoto 
Forever” scenario and in the presence of technological cooperation 





















































Therefore, with this new model, a technology-based climate regimes seems 
to be more environmental effective than an emission-based climate regime. 
However, the comparison is made with the “Kyoto forever” scenario, whose 
environmental effectiveness is reduced by the absence of mandatory targets 
for the US, China and other big emitters. This comparison would be useful 
only if, as in the case of the first version of FEEM RICE, emission in the 
presence of technological cooperation were larger than in the “Kyoto 
forever” scenario. 
 
Let us therefore consider a different emission-based scenario. We assume 
that all countries are committed to achieve a 550 ppm stabilisation goal, and   26
that they can decide to achieve it either with or without technological 
cooperation. Figure 3 shows the dynamics of carbon emissions when 
technological cooperation is implemented without an emission target, when 
the 550 ppm stabilisation target is achieved without technological 
cooperation, and when technological cooperation is also implemented. 
 
Figure 3. The dynamics of carbon emissions in the technology-based 
scenario, in the 550 ppm stabilisation scenario without technological 





There are a few interesting remarks that can be derived by looking at Figure 
3. First, technological cooperation alone, without emission targets, can 
stabilise concentrations at a level very close to 550 ppm. Only in the long 
run the line describing emissions in the case of technological cooperation 
without an emission target diverges from the line describing emissions when 
the 550 ppm stabilisation target is optimally achieved without technological 






















































cooperation yields the kind of scenarios outlined in Hanson et al (2004).
28 
That is, cooperative technology development (independent of climate 
policies) drives the market in such a way as to increase both GDP and 
reduce GHG intensities. As a consequence, if countries cooperate on 
technological innovation and diffusion, 550 ppmv may become the new 
reference case; and the capacity of the economy may be sufficiently 
strengthened such that, when the time arrives and climate issues inevitably 
emerge as a critical policy driver, there will be significant shift in 
commitment and resources to achieve an even smaller level of emissions 
(see also Velte et al., 2004 for this kind of scenario). 
 
Nonetheless, in the presence of technological cooperation, emissions are 
larger than in the two cases in which an emission target is introduced. 
Therefore, a second remark is as follows. The presence of an emission target 
lowers emissions more than what technological cooperation alone would do. 
Is it therefore optimal to have both technological cooperation and a stringent 
emission target? Figure 3 provides an ambiguous answer. Both with and 
without technological cooperation it is possible to achieve the stabilisation 
target. However, the timing of policy is different. With technological 
cooperation, emissions are smaller at the beginning of the optimisation 
period and then become larger. The reason is that it is profitable for 
countries to invest in R&D and to abate emissions early rather than late, in 
order to exploit the benefits provided by R&D investments and the related 
learning process. In other words, countries find it optimal to accelerate the 
movement along the technology learning curves.  This is shown in Figure 4, 
where R&D investments are larger in the presence of technological 
cooperation than without it.  
 
In particular, in the first commitment periods, if countries cooperate on 
technological innovation and diffusion, they find it optimal to increase their 
R&D investments, which then display their beneficial impacts in the 
                                                      
28 We are grateful to one of the referees for this reference.   28
subsequent periods. Among these positive impacts there are those on 
economic growth, which however increase emissions, as Figure 3 shows. 
Therefore, we find again the effect that was dominant in the case of the first 
version of FEEM RICE, namely that larger initial R&D investments 
stimulate economic growth and therefore have negative effects on emissions 
in the long-run. This effect is however milder in the second version of 
FEEM RICE than in the first version, because of the stronger and more 
diffuse effects of technical change on carbon intensity and energy 
efficiency. 
 
It may be interesting to observe what happens when a more stringent 
abatement target is imposed. Figure 5, where the dynamics of carbon 
emissions in the presence of a 450 stabilisation target is also shown, 
suggests that technological cooperation may be redundant if countries must 
comply with a more stringent stabilisation goal. 
 
Figure 4. The dynamics of R&D investments in the technology-based 
scenario, in the 550 ppm stabilisation scenario without technological 
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The line describing the optimal emission path with technological 
cooperation almost coincides with the one in which technological 
cooperation is not carried out. Therefore, in the presence of a very stringent 
emission target, the amount of R&D investments that a single country finds 
it optimal to undertake unilaterally almost coincides with the amount that it 
would undertake in the presence of technological cooperation, i.e. a joint 
decision about optimal investments in R&D. There is still a difference in the 
first commitment periods, where more R&D investments are undertaken in 
the case of technological cooperation. 
 
Figure 5. The dynamics of carbon emissions in the technology-based 
scenario, in the 550 and 450 ppm stabilisation scenarios without 
technological cooperation and in the 550 and 450 ppm stabilisation 



























































5.  Conclusions 
The analysis of this paper has been motivated by the increasing number of 
bilateral deals on technological cooperation that have emerged  following 
the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, and independently 
of this flow of initiatives on technological cooperation, the proposal of a 
technology-based climate protocol has been debated from a theoretical   30
perspective and its properties in terms of participation incentives have been 
highlighted by several authors (e.g. Barrett, 2001, 2002).  
 
As a consequence, the main objective of this paper was to verify, using an 
applied game theory approach, whether a climate regime based on 
cooperation on technological innovation and diffusion, without any binding 
abatement commitments, could be self-enforcing and yield lower total 
carbon emissions than the standard – not very environmentally ambitious – 
“Kyoto forever” regime. Were this conjecture true, a technology-based 
climate agreement could replace agreements focused on emission abatement 
targets, because it would provide both stronger incentives to participate and 
a better performance in terms of environmental effectiveness.  
 
The scenarios that have been analysed in this paper partly support the above 
conjecture. A technology- based regime is more stable than an emission-
based regime, i.e. more countries are likely to participate in the climate 
regime. In addition, technological cooperation without emission abatement 
commitments increases economic growth. However, this strategy is unlikely 
to lower global GHG emissions, i.e. a technology-based protocol does not 
seem to be environmentally effective. This conclusion is clearly supported 
by our analysis with the first version of FEEM RICE, but is less cogent 
when using the second version of FEEM RICE. In this latter case, technical 
change is more effective in reducing carbon and energy intensity. Therefore, 
technological cooperation can do better than a “Kyoto forever” regime in 
reducing global carbon emissions. However, technological cooperation 
becomes less and less important as the stringency of the stabilisation goal 
increases. The reason is that stringent stabilisation goals induce large R&D 
investments even in the absence of technological cooperation.  
 
Of course, the conclusions of this study need to be tested using other models 
and other specifications of technical change. This would provide additional 
evidence on the properties of a technology-based climate protocol and   31
would enable us to draw sounder conclusions. At the same time, the 
conclusion of this study should not be taken as a rejection of a technology-
based protocol. Its solid theoretical properties, the positive signs expressed 
by the industry towards a technology-based regime and the increased 
amount of bilateral deals signed among different countries around the world 
suggest that technological cooperation would be part of a successful strategy 
to control climate change. Technological cooperation should be considered 
as an element of a more comprehensive policy strategy through which 
emission reductions are actually achieved at the global level – possibly in a 
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